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Some thirty-five years ago Professor E. Merrick Dodd of the
Harvard Law School asked whether effective enforcement of the
fiduciary duties of corporate managers was practicable .' His
answer was pessismistic ; the legal rules of conduct could be en-
forced, at best, with only moderate success! Dodd did not, how-
ever, advocate the abandonment of the fiduciary standard. Until
the evolution of some other standard, its retention was essential
as the only means of exerting some control over directors' con-
duct.'
At the time Professor Dodd wrote, the American federal
securities legislation had just been drafted. Its implementation and
enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission in the
intervening years has wrought major changes in corporate law
and practice . Accompanying the growth of securities regulation,
now so extensive it is characterized as federal corporate law,'
have been major reforms in state corporation statutes .-' Moreover,
federal and state legislative activity has been paralleled by the
growth of corporate common law,' mainly through minority share-
holders' suits, facilitated by the federal rules of practice governing
class actions' and derivative suits, and by the spur of the contingent
*Stanley M. Beck, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto.
3 Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate
Managers Practicable (1934-35), 2 U. Chi. L. Rev. 194.' Ibid., at p. 207.
3 Ibid ., at p. 206.
'See Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment (1965),
78 Harv . L. Rev. 1146 .
5 Outstanding examples are the New York Bus. Corp . Law (McKinney
1970) ; and the California Corporations Code (West Supp . 1970) . See
generally, Folk, Corporation Statutes : 1959-1966, [19661 Duke L.J . 876.c Outstanding examples among many are Perlman v. Feldmann (1955),
219 F. 2d 173 (2nd Cir.) ; Diamond v. Oreamuno (1969), 248 N.E . 2d
910 (N.Y.C.A.) ; Jones v. Ahmanson (1969), 460 P. 2d 464 (S.C . Calif.) .
'Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23 and particularly Rule 23.1 .
A similar important state rule is Rule 23(b) of the Rules of the Court of
Chancery, Delaware C. Ann. See generally Cohn, The New Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (1966), 54 Geo. L.J . 1204 : Dykstra, The Revival of
the Derivative Suit (1967), 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 74 ; Note, Class Action
Treatment of Securities Fraud Suits Under the Revised Rule (1968), 36
Geo. Wash . L. Rev. 1150 .
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The Saga of Peso Silver Mines 81
fee.' And perhaps most important of all, the American judiciary
has been alive to the realities of the corporate world and willing
to play its essential part in corporate regulation .
The picture in the Anglo-Canadian corporate world, while
having patches of similarity, has not developed in nearly so bright
a fashion. There has been nothing to match the enormous impact
of the Securities and Exchange Commission supported by a re-
ceptive judiciary. Serious securities regulation in the Common-
wealth dates from the Ontario Securities Act of 1966,9 now almost
uniformly copied by the other Canadian provinces. But the legis-
lative word is far less important than the administrative deed,
and while the Ontario Securities Commission has done a com-
mendable job in the few years since the new legislation, it is neither
constituted, nor motivated, to be the regulatory agency that the
Securities and Exchange Commission is . Moreover, the Securities
Commissions of British Columbia and Quebec, the other major
Canadian securities jurisdictions, while operating under similar
legislation, vary greatly in their philosophy and practice of regula-
tion . What is needed is a single federal agency, but political and
constitutional difficulties make its creation in the near future un-
likely.
England, not untypically, makes do with a mixture of legis-
lation, codes of conduct and stock exchange rules." It is doubtful
they are effective in controlling the conduct of the securities in
dustry . If corporate history and human nature are any guide,
only a regulatory agency armed with effective sanctions can do
the job required ."
8 It is too often assumed by outsiders that the contingent fee is merely
a device to enrich American lawyers . Its role in facilitating access to the
courts of minority shareholders and minority groups of all kinds, has never
been seriously studied outside the United States . Currently it is playing
an important role in public interest class actions . With so much law, re-
form in Canada being copied from American precedents, it is suggested
that it is time to re-evaluate the role of the contingent fee in the American
legal system and consider whether it, or some modification of it, might not
serve a useful purpose in Canada . For an interesting analysis of the con-
tingent fee in the United States see, Schwartz and Mitchell, An Economic
Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation (1970), 22
Stanford L. Rev . 1125 . For its relationship to the poor client see, Note,
Contingent Fees and the Eligibility of the Poor for Free Government
Funded Legal Services (1969), 4 Harv . Civil Rights L . Rev. 415 . See
generally, Note, Contingent Fees Contracts-Validity, Controls, and En-
forceability (1951), 47 Iowa L . Rev. 942. The only article in Canada on
the subject is Williston, Contingent Fees in Canada (1968), 6 Alta L.
Rev . 184.
9 S.O ., 1966, c . 142, as am.
"See, Misrepresentation Act, 1967, c . 7 ; Regulations of the London
Stock Exchange; Prevention of Fraud . (Investments) Act, 1958, c. 45, City
Code on Take-Overs and -Mergers (1969) ; Protection of Depositors Act,
1963, c . 16 ; Licensed Dealers (Conduct of Business) Rules, 1960, Com-
panies Act, 1967, c. 81 .
" The inadequacy of the controls in England is graphically documented
in Stamp & Marley, Accounting Principles and the City Code : the Case for
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Company law reform has also proceeded slowly . Ontario
passed a major new law in 197012 and England revised her Com-
panies Act in 1967,13 some five years after the Jenkins Report." A
major "reform in structure and philosophy" is promised in Eng-
land for some time in the future.' A federal task force was ap-
pointed to revise the Canada Corporations Act some three years
ago and its full report is still awaited. If the hostile reception that
some preliminary reforms received from the Commons and Senate
Committees before they were enacted is any guide, it will be a
number of years before a new federal corporation law emerges.'
Such changes in the law as have been made do go some way to
providing for more effective enforcement of fiduciary duties and
protection of minority rights . Too often, however, the reforms are
only partially thought through, are inadequate to the task, or re-
quire complementary reforms that are not forthcoming.
The Ango-Canadian judiciary while not insensitive to corporate
realities, has been neither bold nor imaginative in fashioning a
corporate common law commensurate with the need . But the
fault has not been the judiciary's alone. The Bar has shown a
similar lack of boldness and imagination in pressing and fighting
shareholders' claims . Part of the reason undoubtedly springs from
the rule against contingent fees and the heavy costs involved in
fighting-to say nothing of the potentially ruinous cost of losing,
shareholders' suits . And part of the reason is also the procedural
thicket surrounding the rule in Foss V. Harbottle" and the con-
sequent difficulty and uncertainty in prosecuting derivative suits."
Another part of the reason is that the Bar, unlike its American
counterpart, is not oriented to fighting for minority rights, whether
Reform (1970) . The book recounts the details of such well known affairs
as Pergamon Press and Leasco Data, Gallahers and American Tobacco,
and Courtaulds and International Paints and concludes that a British
Securities and Exchange Commission is required to effectively control the
securities industry .
12 Business Corporations Act, 1970, Bill 61 .
13 Companies Act, supra, footnote 10 .
14 (1962), Cmnd 1749 .is President of the Board of Trade (D . Jay) 1966. H. C. Deb., Vol.
741, Col. 359. In introducing the amendments that implemented part of
the Jenkins Report in 1967, Mr. Jay told the House of Commons that the
then Labour Government would later legislate "for wider reforms in the
structure and philosophy of our company law" and that it was time "to re-
examine,the whole theory and purpose of the limited joint stock company,
the comparative rights and obligations of shareholders, directors, creditors,
employees and the community as a whole" . No such welcome re-examina-
tion was forthcoming from the Labour Government and it does not seem
likely that the new Conservative Government will initiate such a study.
16 S.C., 1969-70, c. 70 .
"(1843), 2 Hare 461, 67 E.R . 189. See generally, Beck, An Analysis
of Foss v. Harbottle in, Ziegel (ed.), Canadian Company Law (1967), p.
545.
13 S. 99 of the Business Corporations Act, .supra, footnote 12, clears
away some of the Foss v. Harbottle difficulties for the minority shareholder.
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those of a wealthy but aggrieved corporate minority, or of a dis-
possessed and abused minority of any kind .
Although the pace has been slow, the cumulative effect has
been significant reform in company law and regulation, particularly
in the United States, yet it is doubtful that any of the reforms
outlined would justify a different answer today to the question
that Dodd asked thirty-five years ago. Most of the reasons for
his pessimism are still valid. The main reason was that corporate
capitalism sets before its managers in the public company the
"peculiar ideal of vicarious acquisitiveness"." By this Dodd meant
that in the public company the directors and officers must be ac-
quisitive on behalf of a group of persons-the shareholders-with
whom they have no real connection. It is to this changing, anony-
mous group that the corporate managers are ultimately, if not
legally, fiduciaries."
Dodd doubted whether the idea of working faithfully for the
profit of others was one that was calculated to appeal to the direc-
tors' instincts. And the legal rules governing the conduct of a
powerful group are unlikely to be effective unless they find ap-
proval in the minds and feelings of an influential part of that
group, regardless of the sanctions that attend their breach . In a
capitalist society men work for their own wealth . Power and
prestige may also be sought, and at some point may replace wealth
as the primary goal, but self-enrichment is the basic motivating
force.
This is not to say that corporate managers are more venal or
-less ethical, or less motivated to conform to legal principles than,
say, ministers or professors . It is merely to recognize the psycho-
logically peculiar position in which the corporate form puts them .
This conflict is further exacerbated by the obvious fact that the
whole purpose of the corporate exercise is profit . Not unnaturally
the managers count their success as much in, terms of personal
profit as in the gain of the enterprise they direct . Thus the im-
pulse to enrichment through breach of fiduciary duty is strong .
The forms that such breaches usually take are too familiar. They
range from excessive remuneration, unconscionable stock options
and pension plans," and unwarranted expense account living, to
"Dodd, op. cit., footnote 1, at p. 205." Ibid ., at p. 200. An employee can be said to be in the same _position .
But close supervision by the employer makes effective enforcement of the
employees duties a not too difficult task . Also the sanctions for disloyalty
-loss of job and possible inability to find other employment, can be quick
and severe . Moreover, the employee is not in a comparable controlling
position that allows him to profit at the expense of his employer." Excessive remuneration, either directly, or indirectly through stock
options, does not necessarily mean there has been a breach of fiduciary
duty . In the United States in 1969, five executives made stock option
profits of more than one million dollars, twenty-four made more than five
hundred thousand dollars, and one hundred and forty-four had gains of one
84
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breaches involved in self-dealing, insider trading and other per-
sonal uses of confidential information, "friendly" dealings between
interlocked and parent-subsidiary boards, and the taking of cor-
porate opportunities .
Combined with the tempting and difficult position that direc-
tors are placed in are a number of factors that minimize the risk
of detection and punishment for fiduciary wrongdoing." Among
these are the ease with which breaches are concealed in com-
plicated transactions, particularly when combined with the desire
of fellow directors and interlocked boards to "get along", the
difficulties shareholders have in obtaining the necessary informa-
tion, the ease with which wrongdoing is classified as business
necessity or a matter of business judgment, the procedural dif-
ficulties inherent in class and derivative suits, the great costs risk
in bringing such suits and the indirect nature of the benefit that
flows from them, the ability of management to control through the
proxy machinery aided by the shareholder tendency to support
management, and a distaste by the judiciary for "getting into
business" which leads to management oriented decisions .
The small corporation is a very different economic and social
organization but even so many of the difficulties inherent in the
enforcement of fiduciary duties in the large, widely held company
are present. If the company is wholly-owned by a family group
there are, of course, few problems . But if there are minority share-
holders almost all that has been said above with respect to the
large public company applies. Indeed, psychologically the matter
may be worse. The controller most probably began the enterprise
as a sole proprietor ; his personal business and the enterprise have
never been separate matters for him, and he probably still regards
the business as "his" business and conducts it as such . This atti-
tude is not uncommon even in the small and medium sized public
company particularly where, as in the past five years, the owners
hundred thousand dollars or more . One fascinating case is that of Eli Lilly
& Co., a leading drug company. Over the past five years its five highest
paid managers have exercised stock options for gains totalling more than
thirteen million dollars, Business Week, Oct. 17th, 1970, p. 49 . These
figures give mute testimony to the effectiveness of the proxy machinery in
allowing management to do as it pleases. Shareholder approval of directors'
remuneration does not necessarily mean that excessive remuneration can-
not be attacked in a derivative suit . The United States Supreme Court has
held that a valid by-law which was passed unanimously by the shareholders
may be struck down if the payments become so large as to amount to
"waste of corporate property" . "If a bonus payment has no relation to the
value of services for which it is given, it is in reality a gift in part and
the majority stockholders have no power to give away corporate property
against the protest of the minority ." Rogers v. Hill (1932), 289 U.S . 582.
at pp . 591-592. In Rogers, the bonus plan for the executives of the Ameri-
can Tobacco Co. which was passed unanimously in 1912, resulted in bonus
payments of two and one-half million dollars in 1930 . Cf. Eliasberg v.
Standard Oil Co . (1952), 92 A. 2d 862.
22 Dodd, op. cit., footnote 1, at p. 197.
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of so many relatively large private concerns have been lured by
the tax laws and a receptive stock market to take their companies
public . It is simply too much to expect that men who have de-
voted a lifetime to building and running a business on their own
terms are suddenly going to consider and conduct themselves as
fiduciaries, despite the educational efforts of their professional ad-
visors.
It is a fact, however, that the flow of reform since Dodd wrote
has left in its wake a large number of disloyal fiduciaries who have
been brought to account, to say nothing of countless others who
have been deterred . Moreover, the legislatures, courts and ad-
ministrative agencies have never been as taken up with matters
of fiduciary responsibility as they are today. And from this it might
well be argued that effective enforcement is being shown to be
possible, particularly when supported by enlightened law reform.
It could be replied, however, that today's more effective enforce-
ment merely reveals the extent of the problem and that for the
reasons advanced above, the enforcement of fiduciary duties will
never be more than moderately successful . Indeed, in an era of
unprecedented prosperity and mass interest in investmentin a
time when investment is referred to as the "money game"z3it is
likely that self-dealing has never been more rampant.
Whether one is an optimist or pessimist with respect to en-
forcement, the one thing that is essential is that the law-the legis-
latures, the agencies and the courts, take as realistic a look at the
problem as is possible . The foregoing analysis is to suggest that
the law-makers have been too optimistic and have too often turned
a blind or insensitive eye in dealing with fiduciary problems . What
follows is an analysis of one of the most -intractable of the prob-
lems in this area, that of corporate opportunities. The focus of
analysis will be the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Peso Silver Mines v. Cropper and the attempts at reform in the
Business Corporations Act, 1970 in Ontario. It will be suggested
that Canada's highest court and its most important Corporations
Act have both fallen short of giving the leadership that is required
to make the practice in the boardroom conform to the law in
books .
1. The Director as Trustee and
Corporate Property: An Historical Analysis.
Most cases of breach of fiduciary duty by directors do not present
any great difficulty . There is usually a clear case of conflict of in-
terest or secret profit or both and the wrongdoer is made to ac-
"Smith, The Money Game (1968) .
24 Peso Silver Mines Ltd . v. Cropper (1966), 58 D.L.R . (2d) 1 (S.C.C .) .
?I Supra, footnote 12.
86
	
LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN [VOL . XLIX
count." There is, however, a class of cases involving what are
termed "corporate opportunities" that raises difficult questions as
to the scope of the fiduciary duties of directors." The decisions,
however, have little value as precedent since the judiciary too often
has been content with the invocation of a formula ("a fiduciary
must not make a profit") or a conclusory statement ("the property,
in equity, belonged to the company") to decide the instant case
in a manner that is unsatisfactory for future reference. What the
policy of the law ought to be with respect to the extent of fiduciary
duties is rarely adverted to." As an attempt will be made in this
article to suggest such a policy, it is perhaps best to start with a
brief examination of the historical roots of directors' fiduciary
duties and the concept of corporate property.
The case that is at the root of fiduciary duties is Keech v.
Sandford." A lessor refused to grant a new term to the infant
beneficiary whereupon the trustee renewed for himself. Lord
Chancellor King laid down the rigid rule that the trustee might not
have the lease, but must hold it on trust for the beneficiary not-
withstanding that the landlord had refused to renew to the bene-
ficiary and that, the trustee had acted in perfect good faith . The
decision was clearly prophylactic, directed to preventing the in-
evitable results' of temptation." There had been neither loss nor
damage to the trust, nor unjust enrichment of the trustee. As to
the trustee the decision may well have been inequitable . Indeed,
this charge is often made against decisions that apply the Keech
principle in the modern corporate context."
Perhaps the earliest case in which trust principles were applied
to those who occupied a position analogous to a director was The
Charitable Corporation v. Sutton in 1742." TheCorporation, creat
ed by royal charter, was managed by fifty committeemen who were
accused of breach of trust and fraud. In the course of his judgment
26 Typical cases are Zwicker v. Stanbury, [1953] 2 S.C.R . 438, [1954]
1 D.L.R. 257; Canada Safeway Ltd. v. Thompson, [1951] 3 D.L.R . 295;
Charles Baker Limited v. Baker, [1954] O.R . 418; Cook v. Deeks, [1916]
1 A.C . 554.
"'Typical cases are Peso, supra, footnote 24 ; Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v.
Gulliver, [1942] 1 All E.R. 378; Burg v. Horn (1967), 380 F. 2d 897 (2nd
Cir.) ; Phipps v. Boardman, [1967] 2 A.C . 46 (although a case involving
trustees and not directors, the case is one that examines, on a very diffi-
cult set of facts, the corporate opportunity doctrine) .
18 Both Bull J.A . and Norris J.A . (dissenting) did make reference to
what the governing policy oueht to be in their Peso judgments in the British
Columbia Court of Appeal (1966), 56 D.L.R . (2d) 117. In affirming, the
Supreme Court ducked the policy point.
29 (1726), Sel. Cas. T. King 61, 25 E.R. 223.
30 " . . for I very well see, if a trustee, on the refusal to renew, might
have a lease to himself, few trust estates would be renewed to the cestui que
use." per King L.C. ibid., at p. 62 .
31 See generally, Jones. Unjust Enrichment and the Fiduciary's Duty of
Loyalty (1968), 84 L.Q . Rev. 472.
32 (1742), 2 Atk 400, 26 E.R . 642.
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Lord Chancellor I-Iardwicke characterized the committeemen as
"most properly agents to those who employ them in this trust . . ." .33"By accepting of a trust of this sort, a person is obliged to execute
it with fidelity . . ." .34 here we see what runs . through all of the
earliest cases concerning alleged breaches of duty by partners and
directors, a mixing of the language of trusts, agency, and of
fiduciary relations generally .
The matter was put clearly by Vice-Chancellor Bruce in
Benson v. Heathorn." In holding to account a director of a joint-
stock company who had sold his own ship to the company when
he was under a duty to purchase for it, the Vice-Chancellor said:`
It is mainly this danger, the danger of the commission of fraud in a
manner and under circumstances which, in the great majority of in-
stances, must preclude detection, that in the case of trustees and all
parties whose character and responsibilities are similar (for there is
no magic in the word), induces the court (not only for the sake of
justice in the individual case, but for the protection of the public
generally, and with a view to assert and vindicate the obligation of
plain and direct dealing between man and man in all cases, but es-
pecially in those where one man is trusted by another), to adhere
strictly to the rule that no profit shall be made by a person so cir-
cumstanced .
The Vice-Chancellor then went on to quote Lord Eldon in a pas-
sage whose echo is still heard, and often criticized, today:"
The rule is founded on this, that though you may see in a particular
case that he [the trustee] has not made advantage, it is utterly im-
possible to examine upon satisfactory evidence in the power of the
court, by which I mean, in the power of the parties in ninety-nine
cases out of a hundred, whether he has made advantage or not.
In a recent case" the ]English Court of Appeal cast some doubt
on the severity of Lord Eldon's approach, and more than one com-
mentator has recently wondered whether it is sensible to require
from every fiduciary the same degree of loyalty that Equity de-
mands from a trustee." Whatever might be the merits of a change
in approach in cases concerning individual trustees, it is suggested
that the realities of the governance of the modern corporation re-
quire that Equity's severity continue to be applied to corporate
directors .
Another important case in which liability was imposed by
"Ibid., at pp. 644-645 (E.R.) .
' Ibid., at p . 645 .
sc (1842), 1 X. & C.C.C . 326, 62 E.R . 909.
"Ibid., at pp. 916-917 (E.R.) .
$' Ibid.
"Holder v. Holder, [1968] Ch. 353, and particularly Danckwerts L.J .,
at p . 398 .
as See, Jones, op . cit ., footnote 31, at p. 490, and McClean, The Theoreti-
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analogy to trust and agency principles was Attorney-General v.
Wilson" in 1840 . In that case the members of the governing body
of a municipal corporation fraudulently alienated certain of the
corporation's property. When suit was brought in the name of the
corporation against the wrongdoers it was argued that restoration
of the property could not be given in a case in which the corpora-
tion was plaintiff because the acts complained of were acts of the
corporation and a cestui que trust cannot complain of a breach of
trust to which he was a party. In rejecting this argument Lord
Cottenham L.C . said:"
The true way of viewing this is to consider the members of the govern-
ing body of the corporation as its agents, bound to exercise its functions
for the purposes for which they were given, and to protect its interests
and its property ; and if such agents exercise these functions for the pur-
pose of injuring its interests and alienating its property . . . the cor-
poration may complain, and may have redress against such members
and agents as are authors of the wrong.
A case which has a good deal of relevance for corporate op-
portunity problems is Ex Parte Bennett.' Although the case is not
one concerning a director or partner, it does show Equity's uni
form approach to those occupying a position of confidence . In Ben-
nett the solicitor to the Commission of Bankruptcy retained one
of the Commissioners to bid at an estate auction for one of his
clients. In setting aside the sale, Lord Chancellor Eldon reiterated
the view that it was not necessary to show any advantage had ac-
crued to the purchaser . It was the duty of the assignee and the
solicitor to collect for the benefit of the bankrupt and the creditors
all the information that would enable them to sell at the most
advantageous price. They were barred, therefore, from bidding
themselves :'
. . . for human infirmity will in very few instances permit a man to
exert against himself that providence which a vendor ought to exert in
order to sell to the best advantage, and which a purchaser is at liberty
to exert for himself in order to purchase at the lowest price.
Moreover, the court could not institute an investigation to dis-
cover what information the assignee had or what use he had made
of it:"
No court of justice could institute investigation to that point effectually
in all cases ; and therefore the safest rule is, that a transaction, which
under circumstances should not be permitted, shall not take effect, upon
the general principle; as if ever permitted, the inquiry into the truth of
the circumstances may fail in a great proportion of the cases .
These cases illustrate not only that a fiduciary would not be
40 (1840), Cr . & Ph . 1, 41 E.R. 389.41 Ibid., at pp . 396-397 (E.R .) .
1 (1805), 10 Ves. 381, 32 E.R . 893.1 Ibid., at p. 897 (E.R .) .44 Ibid., at p. 900.
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allowed to profit by direct dealing with the principal and his
property, but also the wider rule that a fiduciary must not use
his position to appropriate for himself benefits which he ought to
have acquired, if at all, for the principal.' It is from these cases
that a line may be traced to the current problem of corporate op-
portunity. Lord Brougham gave expression to this wider rule in
Harnilton v. Wright,' a case in which an assignee who had pur-
chased an annuity from the estate was not allowed to enforce it
further than repayment of the purchase price:
There cannot be a greater mistake than to suppose, as seems to have
been done below, that a trustee is only prevented from doing things
which bring an actual loss upon the estate under his administration . It
is quite enough that the thing which he does has a tendency to injure
the trust; a tendency to interfere with his duty . . . . Nor is it only on
account of the conflict between his interest and his duty to the trust
that such transactions are forbidden. The knowledge which he acquires
as trustee is of itself a sufficient ground of disqualification, and of re-
quiring that such knowledge shall not be capable of being used for his
own benefit to injure the trust . . . . °
The early cases illustrating the wider principle are those con-
cerning the renewal of a lease on partnership property by one of
the partners in his ownname prior to the dissolution of the partner
ship . Invariably, Equity took the view that the partner had used
his position to obtain an advantage for himself and must hold the
acquired property in trust for the partnership." With respect to
partners, the rule was carried to the extent of not allowing them
to carry on a competing business that might injure the partnership,
or to carry on any business that but for their connection with
the partnership they would not have been in a position to carry
on." Lord Lindley put the matter succinctly. :."
. . . if his connection with the firm enables him to acquire gain, he
cannot appropriate the gain to himself on the pretence that it arose
from a separate transaction with which the firm had nothing to cjo .
There has been some debate over whether the cases illustrate
a profit rule (a trustee is not entitled to make a profit), or a con-
flict rule (a trustee must not place himself in a position where
his interest and duty conflict), or whether there is a single over-
lapping rule." Without entering into a lengthy - analysis of the
cases, it is suggested that the evil that Equity set its face rigidly
against was possible conflict of interest . This was clearly the ra-
Lindley, Law of Partnership, Vol. 1 (4th ed ., 1878), p. 572." (1842), 9 Cl . & Fin. 110, 8 E.R. 357.
47 Ibid ., at p. 123 (emphasis supplied) .
48 Featherstonhaugh v . Fenwick (1810), 17 Ves. 298, 34 E.R . 115;
Clegg v. Fishwick (1848), 1 Mac. & G. 294, 41 E.R . 1278 .
49 Lindley, op. cit., footnote 45, p. 577.so Ibid.
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tionale of the seminal case of Keech v. Sandford." In the great
majority of ,cases, however, both conflict and profit are referred
to for a profit has usually been made, or property obtained, as a
result of a conflict of interest . But proof of profit is not necessary
to obtain the intervention of Equity.In Re Thompson," Clauson J.,
indicated that he would restrain a trustee from opening a business
competitive with that operated by the trust . The position was
properly put by Lord Denning M.R . and Lord Upjohn in Phipps
v. Boardman," although they disagreed as to the result :
The relevant rule for the decision of this case is the fundamental rule
of equity that a person in a fiduciary position must not make a profit
out of his trust which is part of the wider rule that a trustee must not
place himself in a position where his duty and his interest may conflictse
In his judgment in the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning M.R.,
said there was "another ground of liability" apart from the profit
the trustees had made. Boardman had "placed himself in a posi
tion where there was a conflict between his duty to advise an ap-
plication to the court and his interest to acquire the shares him-
self . . . 1°.s
In summary it may be said that there are two independent
rules, those of conflict and profit ; that the conflict rule is the
broader rule of general application out of which the profit rule
grew; that it is possible to conceive of situations, and indeed there
have been cases, where liability has been imposed where there
has been profit and no conflict and vice versa;" and that in the
majority of cases the judicial language mixes the two rules simply
because conflict and profit are both present.
This brief survey of the early cases suggests a number of con-
clusions . First, fiduciary obligations are not imposed on directors
because they are trustees or because they occupy a position similar
to that of a trustee . The obligations are imposed because they are
fiduciaries-because confidence is reposed in them to manage
property that, ultimately, belongs to others . The matter was put
plainly by Danckwerts J . :"
. . . the directors are the persons who in fact control the corporation
and decide what shall be done . It is plain that those persons are as
much in a fiduciary position as trustees in regard to any acts which
are done respecting the corporation and its property . . . therefore it
sz Supra, footnote 29 .
sa [1930] 1 Ch. 203 . The wrongs complained of had been remedied after
the writ was issued. For the purposes of costs, Clauson J ., had only to
decide whether the defendant was entitled to the right he claimed, which
was to open a competing business .
s4Supra, footnote 27.ss Ibid., at p . 123, per Lord Upjohn (dissenting) . Viscount Dilhorne also
was of the opinion that there were the two separate grounds of liability .s e [1965] Ch . 992, at p . 1020 (C.A .) .
57 See the cases cited in McLean, op . cit ., footnote 39 .
"In re The French Protestant Hospital, [1951] Ch . 567, at p. 570 .
1971]
	
The Saga of Peso Silver Mines 91
seems to me plain that they are, to all intents and purposes, bound by
rules which affect trustees.
Numerous judges" and scholars" have pointed out the many essen-
tial differences -between a director and a trustee and the only ex-
cuse for making the point once again is that the question is often
asked whether it is sensible, in the modern corporate context, to
treat directors as trustees? The view that it is not, depends to a
large extent on showing that directors have different functions and
duties than do trustees . But this, it is submitted, is irrelevant to the
real question . The issue is not whether directors should be treated
as trustees . The real question is whether the conceded differences
in function between trustees and directors are sufficiently relevant
or important to warrant the application of different rules to direc-
tors . The answer is not advanced by showing that. directors are
not trustees . It is advanced-by asking whether the rationale of the
fiduciary principle has relevance to the corporate director - given
the management role the director now plays, the legal and factual
distribution of corporate power between the director and the share-
holder, and the functional and procedural reality behind that dis-
tribution of power.
Second, the cases illustrate a much broader scope of -fiduciary
loyalty than merely refraining from dealing directly with the prin-
cipal or his property without full disclosure, or making a secret
profit at his expense. A fiduciary must not use his position, and
all that comes to him because of that position, for his personal
advantage . Ile cannot appropriate to himself,property or oppor-
tunities, the chance for which came to him because of the position
he occupied . It is this principle which is behind the development
of the law of corporate fiduciaries in the United States, particularly
with respect to insider-trading, but that often has been lost sight of
in "corporate opportunity" cases such as Peso Silver Mines in
Canada.
Third, the wider rule of fiduciary obligation is that a man may
not occupy a position in which his interest and .duty may conflict.
This principle has been almost completely abandoned in com
pany law with legislation blessing interlocking boards through
rules relating to transactions in which directors are interested,"
ss See e .g. In Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Company, Limited,
[19251 1 Ch . 407 .so Sealy, The Director as Trustee, [19671. Camb . L.J . 83 . For a useful
discussion of fiduciary relationships generally see Sealy, Fiduciary Relation-
sh[19621 Camb. L.J. 69 .
134 of the Business Corporations Act, supra, footnote 12, is typical
of the provisions that allow directors to be interested in contracts with the
company providing they give notice of their interest and refrain from
voting. S . 134 contains a number of useful reforms in this usual provision.
It does not allow a director to make a general declaration of interest in
other concerns and forever after remain silent. He must declare "the nature
and extent" of his interest at the meeting at which the contract or trans-
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and through casual judicial dicta which has allowed directors to
serve with competing firms." It is suggested that in a climate of
company law reform it is time to take a realistic second look at
interlocking boards and directors who are allowed to compete.
II . The Saga of Peso Silver Mines .
The modern doctrine of corporate opportunity is simply an ex-
tension of Equity's old rule that a fiduciary must not use his posi-
tion to appropriate for himself benefits which he ought to have
acquired, if at all, for his principal . In corporate terms, the test
action is first considered. The director must be "acting honestly and in good
faith" and the contract must be in the "best interest of the corporation" for
the contract not to be voidable by reason only of the director's interest. If
the matter is taken before a general meeting it requires a two-thirds vote
for confirmation . While the revision in s . 134 is welcome, it is typical of
company law reform that is only half done . There is no requirement of
notice to the shareholders of those contracts in which the directors were
interested . Surely it is not too much to ask that once a year the share-
holders be informed of how many contracts with the company their direc-
tors are interested in or, to put it another way, how many times the direc-
tors have been excused from their fiduciary duties by their fellow fidu-
ciaries . The rule in North West Transportation v. Beatty (1887), 12 App.
Cas. 589 (P.C .) was not abrogated, as it is submitted it ought to have
been, and directors are still allowed to vote qua shareholders to confirm
their own contracts with the company. It is true that the confirming
majority at the general meeting has been raised to two-thirds but this will
only mean that fewer of such contracts will be placed before the share-
holders for confirmation, leaving them more uninformed than ever. Finally
there is a vague standard of materiality raised by which a director does
not have to declare his interest unless both his interest and the contract
are material . Such vague standards have no place in this type of legislation
-the directors should not be the ones to decide what is material. If it was
desired to except minor matters then, for instance, contracts or trans-
actions involving less than $5,000.00 should have been excepted.
"London & Mashonaland Exploration Co . Ltd. v. New Mashonaland
Exploration Co . Ltd., [18911 W.N . 165; Bell v. Lever Brothers Ltd.,
[1932] A.C . 161 ; Waite's Auto Transfer Ltd. v. Waite, [1928] 3 W.W.R .
649 (Man . K.B .) . Some of the worse effects of this judicial rule have been
lessened by s . 210 of the English Companies Act, 1948, c. 38 . In Scottish
Cooperative Wholesale Society Ltd. v. Meyer, [1959] A.C. 324, Lord Den-
ning was referred to Lord Blanesburgh's view in Bell, supra, that a director
could join the board of a rival company, to which he replied :
"That may have been so at that time. But it is at the risk now of an
application under s. 210 if he subordinates the interests of the one com-
pany to those of the other."
The Business Corporations Act, (Ontario) 1970, ibid., does not contain
any provision similar to' s. 210 which is one of the most important legis-
lative pirovisions written for the protection of minority shareholders . It is
found in the Companies Acts of England, Australia, South Africa, India
and the province of British Columbia . The Committee which prepared the
report upon which the new Ontario Act is based rejected s . 210 for the
lame reason that it would result in the courts "getting into business". The
same committee did not even consider the problem of competing directors
and no provision dealing with the matter appears in the new Ontario Act.
These are but two examples of "half-way" company law reform. For an
analysis of the applicable American law see, Note, Fiduciary Duty of
Officers and Directors not to Compete with the Corporation (1941), 54
Harv . L. Rev. 1191 .
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should be whether the opportunity was so closely associated with
the existing and prospective activities of the corporation that the
directors should fairly have acquired it for, or made it available
to the corporation." If an affirmative answer is given to the ques-
tion posed, a showing of good faith should, as in all cases of
fiduciary duty, be no defence." The Peso case will be analyzed in
light of the above standard . It is a standard which no Anglo-
Canadian court has explicitly formulated, but it is one which is
implicit in the early cases and it is a natural extension of Equity's
guardianship to protect the corporation and its shareholders .
The facts in Peso were as follows . Peso Silver Mines Ltd. was
incorporated as a private company in British Columbia in March,
1961, to take over a group of silver mining claims in the Yukon
held by Tanar Gold Mines Ltd . The defendant Cropper, along
with his. associates Walker and Verity, was instrumental in incor-
porating both Tanar and Peso . Cropper, Walker and Verity were
Peso's first directors, and Cropper was the managing director. In
September, 1961, Peso was converted to a public company and
shares were sold to the public, the proceeds being used to finance
development of the claims." Peso acquired further claims and by
March, 1962, held 362 claims covering twenty square miles, the
purchase and development of which had put a considerable strain
on its finances .
"This is a slight rewriting of the test applied in Rosenblum v. Judson
Engineering Corp . (1954), 109 A. 2d 558, at p . 563 (S.C.N.H.) . This test
is similar too but, somewhat broader than the provision that the Jenkins
Committee, supra, footnote 14, recommended for inclusion in the English
Companies Act :
"A director of a company should not make use of any money or other
property of the company or of any information acquired by virtue of
his position as a director or officer of the company to gain directly
or indirectly an improper advantage for himself at the expense of the
company." (para . 99 (a) (ii) ) .
"Alvest, Inc. v. Superior Oil Corporation (1965), 398 P . 2d 213, at
p. 216 (S . C . Alaska) .
I The sale of the claims from one private company, Tanar, to anotherprivate company, Peso, with almost identical shareholders is explicable asthe technique used in mining promotion to enable the vendor to acquire a
"vendor's position" in the shares of the new company which will subse-quently go public to raise money for exploration . How large the vendor's
position can be is regulated by the Securities Commissions . In British
Columbia in 1961 it was 750,000 shares . The Commissions invariably re-
quire that these shares be held in escrow for a stated length. ôf time . Thevendor's position shares plus "free" shares (presumably called free shares
in mining parlance to distinguish them from the escrowed vendor's position
shares) in the new company which the promoters usually acquire for pennies
while the new company is still private, assures the promoters of control, atleast in the initial stages, of the new company when it goes public. It also,
of course, usually assures them of substantial profits regardless of whether
or not a mine is ever developed. It can be gathered from Cropper's evidence,
Case on Appeal, Vol. 1, that he owned over time, directly, or indirectly
through Tartar, approximately 200,000 shares of Peso for which he paid
somewhere between 10c and 13c a share . Af the time of the-trial, Peso wasselling for $1.90 a share .
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In late March, 1962, Peso, through Cropper and Verity, was
offered three groups of claims (the Dickson .claims), one of which
was contiguous to its Yukon holdings . The Peso board, which by
this time had been enlarged to six, turned the offer down because
of strained finances and because it felt Peso had enough ground
under control . Approximately six weeks later, in May, 1962,66
Cropper, Walker, Verity and Dr . Aho, Peso's consulting geologist,
formed a private company, Cross Bow, to take up the Dickson
claims . The Tanar-Peso cycle was repeated with Cross Bow selling
its claims to a new private company incorporated by the same
group, Mayo Silver Mines Ltd., for a vendor's position of 600,000
shares . Mayo was then converted to a public company and shares
were sold to finance developments' In December, 1963, control
of Peso was purchased by Charter Oil for one million dollars.
Friction developed between Berlitz, the president of Charter, and
Cropper, who had been retained as executive vice-president of
Peso, over Charter's instalment payments of the purchase price.
Subsequently Berlitz demanded that Cropper, Walker, and Verity
turn over their interests in Cross Bow and Mayo to Peso . Walker
and Verity agreed to do so but Cropper refused. Peso then com-
menced action against Cropper for an accounting and declaration
of trust, and dismissed him as managing director .
At the trial Peso's suit was dismissed on the basis of a finding
by Gregory J., that "all of the directors, including the defendant,
acted in good faith toward Peso in rejecting the offer of the Dick-
son claims"." The British Columbia Court of Appeal affirmed in
a majority opinion" and on further appeal, the Supreme Court of
Canada affirmed in a unanimous judgment." Given the finding of
good faith rejection of the Dickson claims, each judge who found
for Cropper was then faced with Lord Green's hypothetical in
Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver ." Each quoted the following
statement of Lord Russell of Killowen:"
One final observation I desire to make . In his judgment Lord Greene,
M.R., stated that a decision adverse to the directors in the present case
es The new claims were turned down by the Peso board on March 19th
and Cross Bow was formed to take them up on May 8th, Case on Appeal,
Vol. 1, p. 151.
6TA further example of the position of the promoters in this type of
transaction, outlined supra, footnote 65, can be gathered from the evidence
of Cropper which indicates that at the time Mayo went public in 1962,
Cropper, Walker, Verity and Aho owned directly, or indirectly through
Cross Bow, between 750,000 and 1,000,000 shares of Mayo for which they
had paid only a nominal sum, Case on Appeal, Vol. 1, pp . 180-184.sa Case on Appeal, Vol. 1, p. 219. Mr . Justice Gregory gave oral judg-
ment at the conclusion of the trial and his reasons for judgment have not
been reported.
ss supra, footnote 28 .
'° Supra, footnote 24 .
'1 Supra, footnote 27, [1967] 2 A.C. 134n .
"Ibid., at p. 391.
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involved the proposition that, if directors bona fide decide not to invest
their company's funds in some proposed investment, a director who
thereafter embarks his own money therein is accountable for profits
which he may derive therefrom . As to this I can only say that to my
mind the facts of this hypothetical case bear but little resemblance to
the story with which we have had to deal .
Once the rejection by the board was found to be bona fide, any
subsequent dealing with the property by a director was held not
to be by reason of, and in the course of execution of his office ."
This distinguished the case from what was considered to be the
essential finding in Regal,' and Peso's claim was dismissed.
On this skeletal version of the facts and reasons for judgment,
Peso can be seen to raise some difficult questions. The line of
cases which lead to Peso, particularly Menier v. Hooper's Tele
graph Works," Cook v. l)eeks," Regal," Canada Safeway Ltd. v.
Thompson," Zwicker v. Stanbury,79 Smith Ltd. v. Smith" and Pine
Industrial Commodities v. Powling," all fairly clearly involved the
appropriation of corporate assets or the taking of property by di-
rectors in which the company was or would have been interested,
without first offering ii to, and making full disclosure to, the com-
pany . In Peso there was an offer to the company and a finding of
bona fide rejection before purchase by the directors. Thus Lord
Greene's hypothetical was posed and a negative answer given.
Phipps v. Boardman" raised questions similar to those in
Peso and it has been suggested that the House of Lords gave a
positive answer to Lord Greene's question and that the decisions
in Phipps and Peso are opposed." Whether this is so or not will be
considered later; for now it is enough to note that in Phipps the
trustees commenced to act in the transaction on behalf of the
trust, obtained the essential information by reason of that fact,
and never really separated themselves from the trust. This brought
the case much closer to Regal and the line of cases noted above,
than do the facts in Peso. Before considering the facts and law
in these cases, however, it is necessary to go back over the facts
in Peso in some detail to appreciate the context in which it is al-
leged Lord Greene's hypothetical was raised.
The Peso Company, until the sale to Charter Oil, was con-
'a Peso, supra, footnote 24, per Cartwright J., at p. 8, and supra, foot-
note 28, per Pull J.A ., at p. 156.
"Supra, footnote 27, per Lord Russell, at p. 389.'s (1874), L.R. 9 Ch. App. 350.
's Supra, footnote 26 .
"Supra, footnote 27.'s Supra, footnote 26 .'s Ibid.
8' [19521 hi.Z .L.R. (N.Z .S.C .) .
81 (1954), 71 R.P.C . 253.
82 Supra, footnote 27 (sub . nom . Boardman v. Phipps) .
s3 Gower, The Principles of Modern Company Law (3rd ed ., 1969),pp. 537-538.
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trolled by Walker, Verity and Cropper, and particularly by Crop-
per who was the managing director in charge of exploration policy
and finances . Shortly after Peso was incorporated, the board of
directors was increased to six . The reason for this was, in Crop-
per's words:"
. . . we decided that additions to the Board would be sensible and
people could help us do things, so we added directors.
The role that tnree new directors playea is not clear, aside from
helping the company "do things", presumably in connection with
the public distribution of Peso's shares . What is clear from the
transcript is that the Tanar-Peso promoters, Cropper, Walker and
Verity, were in effective control .
In March, 1962, a prospector, Dickson, spoke to Dr . Aho,
Peso's consulting geologist, about three groups of claims he had
staked, one of which was contiguous to the Peso claims . At Aho's
suggestion, Dickson offered the claims to Peso for $30,000.00 .
Dickson spoke to Cropper and Verity who put the matter to the
Peso board. Whether all six directors were present at the meeting
at which the Dickson claims were considered is not clear . No
minutes of that board meeting were introduced in evidence, al-
though many other minutes were, and the other three directors
were not called to give evidence . The only evidence on the point is
that of Walker, Peso's president :"
Q . Who else was at the meeting when this offer [the Dickson claim]
was made to Peso?
A. I believe all the directors were present.
Q . Was Mr . Cropper there?
A . Yes, Mr . Cropper was there .
In any event, the board turned down the offer because of the
strained state of Peso's finances and also because Aho "didn't
recommend because of its remoteness"" and because "it was a
little too much at this time"."
What happened in the approximate six week interval between
the rejection of the Dickson claims by Peso and the formation of
Cross Dow to take them up is best told by Cropper, Walker and
Verity themselves :
Cropper :
Q . What happened then with the Dickson offer?
A . At the time it was out of my mind but I recall Dr . Aho
coming to me and suggesting that it might be possible for a group
or a separate group to pick that property up because it might have
some interest, and we spoke together with Mr . Walker about it
initially and then we spoke, the three of us, with Mr . Verity and
decided that we might be able to pick up the ground ourselves, we
as Case on Appeal, Vol. 1, p . 18 .
"Ibid., p . 34 .
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might be able to finance the picking up of the ground ourselves 88
Talker :
Q . You say they [the Dickson claims] were turned down by the board
of Peso . Then what happened after that?
A. Well, we were achieving some fairly good results on Peso I think,
and we felt that this ground should be protected, we felt that it
was in our best interest.
Q. Did you discuss this claim with Mr. Cropper and Mr. Verity?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. What was the discussion, if you can remember, or the effect of
them, if you can?
A. The discussion was that this ground could be valuable ground that
we should make an offer to put it together, which the four of us
did, namely Mr. Cropper, myself, Mr. Verity and Dr . Aho 88
Verity :
Q . But in May of 1962, I would suggest to you that Peso didn't know
what it really had up there and what it didn't have in the way of a
mining property .
A . It knew that it had an excellent lead, sir.
Q . But you didn't know at this stage whether this was capable of
making a mine or not?
A . We thought so.e°
On June 13th, 1962, Walker wrote a letter to the Super-
intendent of Brokers dealing with the Dickson claims . The letter
is so central to the case that it is necessary to quote it in full:`




Attention Mr. J. Stewart-Smith :
June 13, 1962
Dear Sir :
As you know, a new group including three directors of Peso
Silver Mines Ltd . (Mr. Cropper, Mr . Verity and myself), have picked
up and staked "blind" approximately 326 claims northeast of the Peso
and Barker ground . Three of these groups of 126. claims were picked
up from a prospector by the name of Dickson and one of these groups
is contiguous to Peso . We wish to bring this to your attention, so that
you will be completely aware of the situation .
As you know, we have been instrumental in picking up for
Peso the Barker Estate ground of .128 claims with known mineralization,
and within the finances of the Peso Company it has reached its limit in
18 Ibid ., p . 149 .
89 Ibid., at p . , 35. Counsel for Cropper objected at this point to Walker
saying "we thought" and "we felt" . Ibid., p . 121 . It is clear from Walker's
testimony, as well as from that of Cropper and Verity, and from the letter
to the Superintendent of Brokers, infra, that each used "we" to refer some-
times to themselves and sometimes to Peso . This is not at all evidence of
bad faith but simply indicates the way that they reflexively thought of the
corporate enterprise they had promoted .
9° Ibid ., p. 121 ."Ibid., p. 67 .
98
	
LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN [VOL . XLIX
ground control .
The directors of Peso as a board, were not interested in the
company acquiring any more ground than they presently have for the
very good reasons, one being that considerable work is yet necessary
on the present ground, and the second that the finances of the com-
pany do not permit the acquisition of additional claims . Other parties
however were interested in acquiring other ground in this district,
and we felt that some control might be maintained if we joined these
groups .
Our first interest is for the Peso shareholders and the con-
tinued and extensive development of the Peso ground, and it is to this
end that our main interest must lie . We do feel, however, that if we did
not become part of this new additional ground control, other people
would be participating and acquiring regardless .
We trust that you will appreciate our motives and would
welcome any thoughts or suggestion that your department may have, so
that we may continue to act with complete integrity and in the best




The letter was written from the plaintiff company and signed by
Walker in his capacity as President . It is clear, however, that the
other three directors were neither informed of, nor knew of the
taking up of the Dickson claims by their fellow directors through
Cross Bow until sometime after Mayo became a public company .
There is evidence that these directors subsequently asked questions
about Cross Bow and Mayo," but the matter was not pursued by
counsel .
The evidence as to Peso's strained finances at the time the
Dickson claims were offered to it was fairly conclusive." Indeed,
Peso's counsel admitted that the company was short of funds at
that time." It is suggested, however, that Peso's financial position
should not have been considered only in isolation at that moment.
When considered in the context of how much Dickson was asking
for his claims, what he subsequently received for them, and the
fact that Cropper was responsible for raising money for Peso, the
matter of financial inability is seen somewhat differently.
Dickson initially asked $30,000.00 for his claims ." What the
Cropper group paid for them is not certain, but there is some
indication it was less than that . In his oral judgment, Gregory J.,
said that the claims were purchased for the same price at which
they had been offered to Peso." The transcript reveals no evidence
92 Ibid ., p. 53 . Cropper expressed the opinion that the other directors
knew of Cross Bow and Mayo, but it is clear that they only knew sometime
after Mayo went public .
93 The development of Peso's claims was estimated to require $250,000 .00
in the first six months of 1962, ibid., pp. 145, 151 .
94 lbid., p. 64. 95 Ibid ., p. 213.
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of that fact . The only evidence is that of Walker who testified that
his total investment in Cross Bow was $2,500.00.96 As Walker,
Cropper, Aho and Verity had equal interests in Cross Bow," it is
a fair inference that the total cash paid Dickson was $10,000.00.
In return for less cash he probably received a greater proportion
of the vendor's position s' when Cross Bow transferred the claims
to Mayo . Could Peso have raised $10,000.00 and made a similar
deal? Its finances were strained, but not so strained that it could
not at almost that very time raise the salaries for Verity and Crop-
per a total of $4,000.00. 99 And the man who was best able to
judge if Peso could raise the money was Cropper himself. Between
incorporation in 1961 and sale to Charter in 1963, Cropper raised
three quarters of a million dollars for Peso's development."'
Despite the suggestion that one of the reasons for Peso's rejection
of the Dickson claims was that it had enough ground under con-
trol,"' the evidence of Walker and Cropper, quoted above, and the
letter to the Superintendent of Brokers, makes it abundantly clear
that if it could have been financed, Walker and Cropper would
have caused Peso to purchase the claims . Walker testified to this
when asked the question by Mr. Justice Gregory:
Q. At the time the offer was made would you, as the director of Peso,
have advocated the purchase of the properties if the purchase could
have been financed.
A. Yes sir, I think they would have."'
®n these facts Mr. Justice Gregory made his finding of good
faith rejection of the Dickson claims by the Peso board. In light
of the unsatisfactory evidence as to whether or not the full board
of Peso considered the matter, and of the relatively , short time
thereafter that the Cropper group picked up the claims at the sug-
gestion of Aho who had recommended their rejection by the com-
pany, and of the fact that the matter was not taken back to the
full board for reconsideration at a time when Peso was "achieving
good results" and Cropper and Walker therefore thought it .would
be best to "control the Dickson claims", this finding is somewhat
difficult to accept . Nevertheless it is the essential finding in the
case, and the question that must be dealt with is whether given
good faith rejection by the Peso board, Cropper was then free, on
the facts as indicated by the evidence set'out above, to purchase the
Dickson claims without making full disclosure to, and getting the
e6 Ibid., p. 34 .
9' This was the understanding of Bull J.A . in the British Columbia Court
of Appeal, supra, footnote 28, at p. 150, and Cartwright J., in the Supreme
Court, supra, footnote 24, at p. 4.s See,footnote 65, supra.
"Case on Appeal, Vol. 1, pp . 67, 160-161 ."I Ibid., p. 126.
101 Ibid., p. 148.
I" Ibid ., p. 116. Walker also expressed the opinion once again that at
the time Peso could not have financed the purchase .
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approval of the Peso shareholders?
III. The Legacy of Regal.
In opening his oral judgment in Peso, Mr. Justice Gregory com-
plained that his task was made more difficult by the fact that
counsel for both parties relied on the same case, Regal (Hastings)
Ltd. v. Gulliver,"' in support of their clients."' In the British
Columbia Court of Appeal, Bull J.A., and Norris J.A., differed
in their interpretation of Regal as applied to the facts."' And in
the Supreme Court, Regal, as applied in Zwicker v. Stanbury,106
was held to be the governing authority. It is essential, therefore, to
reconsider Regal and its application to the corporate opportunity
problem. First, however, the judgments of the Court of Appeal and
the Supreme Court in Peso must be considered .
Mr. Justice Bull said that Regal laid down two separate
grounds of liability."' He cited Viscount Sankey's judgment for
the rule that a fiduciary cannot put himself in a position where his
interest and duty conflict,"' and Lord Russell's judgment for the
rule that a fiduciary cannot retain a profit made by reason of his
fiduciary position ."' The Supreme Court had given approval to the
conflict rule in Zwicker,"° and to the profit rule in Midcon Oil &
Gas Ltd. v. New British Dominion Oil Co . Ltd.,"' and Bull J.A.,
felt bound to apply them to the facts of Peso . Before doing so,
however, he paid the usual deference to the salutary effects of
Equity's "inflexible rules",112 and then expressed his own view of
how those rules should be applied today :"'
. . . in this modern day and country when it is accepted as common-
place that substantially all business and commercial undertakings, re-
gardless of size or importance, are carried on through the corporate
vehicle with the attendant complexities involved by interlocking, sub-
sidiary and associated corporations, I do not consider it enlightened to
extend the application of these principles beyond their present limits.
That the principles, and the strict rules applicable to trustees upon
which they are based, are salutary cannot be disputed, but care should
be taken to interpret them in the light of modern practice and way of
life .
Such astatement of judicial policy is all too rare in corporate cases,
103 Supra, footnote 27 .
"Case on Appeal, Vol. l, n. 218 .
""'Peso Silver Mines Ltd. v. Cropper, supra, footnote 28.
"s Supra, footnote 26.107Supra, footnote 28, at p. 154.
103 Regal, supra, footnote 27, at p. 381.
"I Ibid ., at p. 389.
"'Supra, footnote 26, at p. 259.
111 [19581 S.C.R . 314 (1958), 12 D.L.R . (2d) 705, at pp. 726-727.
112 Supra, footnote 28, at p. 154 citing Parker v. McKenna (1874), 10
Ch. App. 96 per James L.J ., at p. 124.113 Ibid., at pp . 154-155.
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and whether one agrees with it or not, it is to be welcomed . The
wisdom of Mr. Justice Bull's approach will be considered after the
differing opinion of Morris J.A . is set out.
The conflict principle received brief consideration by Bull
J.A. Once the Peso board had bona fide decided not to purchase
the Dickson claims, the company no longer had an interest in
them."' The evidence showed that the company was continuously
receiving offers of properties and once they were rejected any
subsequent dealing by a director with any of them did not raise
a conflict of interest . In both Leech v. Sandford ... and Regal the
property was wanted but, for differing reasons, could not be ob-
tained . The interests of the fiduciary were, therefore, in conflict
with those to whom utmost good faith was owed . This distinguished
those cases from the facts in Peso.
This, surely, is too antiseptic a view of the facts in Peso . There
was ample evidence that peso was in exactly the same position as
the Legal company-it wanted the property but could not finance
its purchase . The company president testified to 'that effect when
asked the question by the trial judge."' Moreover, the testimony
of Walker and Cropper quoted above, indicates that the next best
thing to the company purchasing was to have the Cropper group
protect the company's interests by purchasing themselves . The
letter from Walker, as peso president, to the Superintendent of
Brokers.. . is exactly to that effect . The evidence also was that peso
was achieving "good results" at that time apd this was another
reason for wanting to protect the Dickson ground."' If by May,
1961, Peso had an indication that it had a mine and the Cropper
group thought that peso's interests should be protected with respect
to the Dickson claims, did they not have a duty to take the matter
back to the full peso board rather than purchase themselves? In-
deed, by doing what he in good faith thought was best for the
company by purchasing the claims, Cropper put himself in a
position in which his interest and his duty conflicted . There is
every reason to believe that Cropper acted in good faith in the
original rejection of the offer to peso and in the subsequent pur-
chase, but good faith is irrelevant where the interests of the prin-
cipal call for protection . Moreover, what Danckwerts J., said of
another fiduciary may well be applied to Cropper:'..
. . . it was easy for him to convince himself of this, [that the patent
belonged to him and not the company] because . . . he knew nothing
of the legal obligations relevant to circumstances of this kind and he
. .4 Ibid., at p. 155 ...s Supra, footnote 29 ...e Supra, footnote 104...'Supra, footnote 91 ...a Supra, footnote 89 ... .Pine Industrial Commodities Limited v . Powling, supra, footnote 81
per Danckwerts J., at pp. 261-262.
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has, I think, that businessman's standard of morality which easily
blinds the possessor of it to the distinction between right and wrong
where the interests of the possessor are affected.
The reason for dealing extensively with the facts and quoting
from the Peso transcript in the text of this article, is to show how
wise Equity was in refusing to delve into the bona fides of direc
tors' actions . Cropper and his associates were clearly in control
of the company ; Cropper was the officer responsible for the com-
pany's finances ; the company was unquestionably short of money
when the claims were offered to it and rejected ; and six weeks
later the Cropper group purchased themselves "to protect the
interests of the company" . It is simply not possible in such a
situation for a court to do more than guess in judging individual
motivations and actions, and it should not set itself the task . In
purchasing the claims so short a time after rejection by the com-
pany when the company was interested but financially unable to
purchase, Cropper put himself in a position in which his interest
and his duty were in conflict and he ought to have been required
to account. Once a conflict of interest is found a finding of prior
bona fide rejection of the property becomes irrelevant, and Equity's
rigid rule should have been applied .
Lord Greene's hypothetica112° cannot be answered in the ab-
stract. There may well be a narrow range of cases in which direc-
tors would be justified in taking up opportunities which had, in
good faith, been rejected by the company and in which the com-
pany was no longer interested . But such was not the case, it is sub-
mitted, in Peso. Nor should it be the case on facts where the
controlling directors themselves purchase the property a short time
after rejecting it on behalf of the company. Nor should it be the
case where those responsible for a company's financial policy,
which may well be the entire board of directors, take up the op-
portunity after rejection by the company because of financial in-
ability . The soundest approach to financial inability is that taken
in Irving Trust v . Deutsch :121
120 Supra, footnote 27, per Lord Russell at p. 389 .
121 (1934), 73 F. 2d 121 (2nd Cir.), per Swan J., at p. 124. 1 do not
want to give the impression that financial inability is no defence in the
American corporate opportunity cases or that the Irving Trust case has
been widely followed, for it has not . The courts have been divided on the
issue. Compare Flannerty v. Standard Theatre Co . (1891), 19 S.W . 82 ;
Alger v. Brighter Days Mining Corporation (1945), 160 P . 2d 346 ; and
Beaumont v . Folsom (1939), 285 N.W. 547, in which Irving Trust was
not followed with Electronic Dev. Co . v. Robson (1947), 28 N.W. 2d 130,
which adopted the Irving Trust approach . The best approach for the
courts to take might be to require the board to take every reasonable step
to enable the company to take advantage of the opportunity including a
showing of reasonable and diligent effort to raise the necessary funds . See
generally, Note, Financial Inability as a Defence under the Corporate
Opportunity Doctrine (1951), 29 Kentucky L.J. 229.
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The defendant's argument that the fiduciary principle can have no ap-
plication where the corporation is unable to undertake the venture is
not convincing . If directors are permitted to justify their conduct on
such a theory there will be a temptation to refrain from exerting their
strongest efforts on behalf of the corporation since, if it does not meet
the obligations, an opportunity of profit will be open to them per-
sonally.
The profit principle was relied on most strongly by Peso's
counsel. His argument was that since Cropper and his associates
acquired their knowledge of the claims as directors of Peso, their
subsequent purchase was "in the course of execution of that
office" and they must account. Bull J.A., did not agree. He inter-
preted Lord Russell's judgment in Regal to require a showing that
the transaction was entered into only by reason of the fact that
they were directors, and in the course of execution of their office .
This was the case in Regal where the directors, while acting as
such, purchased the remainder of the subsidiary's shares when the
company could not itself finance their purchase to enable the sub-
sidiary to enter into the lease. It was, throughout, a corporate
transaction in which the directors, in the best interests of the com-
pany, had participated. The directors in Peso were acting in the
course of their office in considering and rejecting the Dickson
claims . Once the claims were rejected the subsequent purchase,
although based on knowledge they had obtained as directors,
could not be said to have been only in their capacity as directors
and "in the execution of that office"."' The subsequent use of
knowledge acquired as a director is not, of itself, sufficient to
bring the profit rule into play .
Mr. Justice Bull expressed the opinion that Lord Russell's
comment on Lord Green's hypothetical... in Regal would have
been superfluous, as the Court of Appeal was being reversed, un
less he intended it to be a reservation that the had no quarrel with
the proposition set out, but the facts of Regal did not fall within
it ."' Bull J.A . was of the opinion that the facts of Peso did fall
within it and the directors were free to purchase. Cartwright J.,
in the Supreme Court agreed with this interpretation of Lord
ussell's comment." With respect, a more likely explanation for
Lord Russell's comment was that he wanted to make it clear that
the hypothetical was not the case that he was faced with and he did
not want to be understood to be deciding that case . Complex cor-
porate cases do not present themselves in the simplicity of Lord
Greene's question, and it is highly unlikely that the House of
Lords would want to decide such a difficult point outside of a
concrete set of facts.
122 Peso, supra, footnote 28, per Bull J.A ., at p. 157.
"'Regal, supra, footnote 27, at p. 389.
12¢ Peso, supra, footnote 28, per Bull J.A ., at p. 158.
125 Peso, supra, footnote 24, per Cartwright J., at p. 9.
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The only difficulty Bull J.A ., felt in deciding the profit point in
favour of the defendants arose from the letter Walker wrote to the
Superintendent of Brokers."' The letter was from the company
and was written by the president signing himself as such . In the
course of the letter Walker used such expressions as "we felt" and
"our first interest" and if, as might be expected in a company
letter, these words had reference to the company, they could be
interpreted to mean that the company had an interest in the claims
and was attempting to maintain some control over them . How-
ever Bull J.A ., was of the opinion that, taken as a whole, the letter
indicated that when Walker used the words "we" and "our" he
was referring not to the company but to the three directors, Crop-
per, Verity, and himself . This interpretation is probably correct,
but does it not indicate that the three directors never, in their own
minds, separated their actions from those of the company? The
oral testimony of Cropper and Walker, quoted earlier, is similar
in that they both said, in effect, "we felt the ground should be
picked up to protect the interests of the company" . In so pur-
chasing the Dickson claims, in good faith and in the best interests
of the company, they were, like the directors in Regal, acting as
directors in the execution of their office and were liable to account .
They were also, as has been submitted, putting themselves in a
position where their interest and duty were in conflict . Bull J.A .
did not interpret the letter that way, however, and dismissed the
appeal .
Norris J.A . wrote a vigorous dissent in which he said the
decision in Regal covered the case."' He relied particularly on
Lord Wright's judgment in which the governing principle was
stated in somewhat broader terms than in the other judgments : ...
The question can be briefly stated to be whether a . . . person in a
fiduciary position, where a demand is made upon him by the person to
whom he stands in the fiduciary relationship to account for profits ac-
quired by him by reason of his fiduciary position, and by reason of the
opportunity and the knowledge, or either, resulting from it, is entitled
to defeat the claim upon any ground save that he made the profits with
the knowledge and assent of the other person.
Mr. Justice Norris read the letter from Peso to the Superintendent
of Brokers as indicating that the company was interested in the
claims and concluded that by purchasing themselves the directors
had made a profit in the course of the execution of their office .
The desire of the company to purchase but financial inability to
do so, followed by purchase by the directors, brought the case
squarely within the facts of Regal."' Mr. Justice Norris also re-
its Supra, footnote 91 .
124 Peso, supra, footnote 28, per Norris J.A ., at p. 125 .
129 Regal, supra, footnote 27, per Lord Wright, at p . 392 (emphasis
added) .
129 Peso, supra, footnote 28, at p. 134.
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plied to the statement of Pull J.A., that the traditional rules of
Equity should not be rigidly applied, or at least not extended, be-
cause of the complexities of modern business .
With the greatest respect, it seems to me that the complexities of
modern business are a very good reason why the rule should be en-
forced strictly in order that such complexities may not be used as a
smoke screen or shield behind which fraud might be perpetrated . The
argument is purely and simply an irrelevant argument of expediency
as to what the law should be, not what it is . It. might as well be said
that such an argument if given effect, to would open the door to fraud,
and weaken the confidence which ordinary people should have in
dealing with corporate bodies . In order that people may be assured of
their protection against improper acts of trustees it is necessary that
their activities be circumscribed within rigid limits. . . . The history
today of the activities of many corporate bodies has disclosed scandals
and loss to the public due to failure of the directors to recognize the
requirements of their fiduciary position . No great hardship is imposed
on directors by the enforcement of the rule, as a very simple course
is available to them which they may follow . [Make full disclosure to,
and seek approval of the shareholders to purchase .1 110
The Supreme Court of Canada shed no light on the difficult
points raised in the Court of Appeal . The unanimous judgment,
delivered by Cartwright J., dealt only with the profit rule and
ignored the wider conflict rule . In dealing with the profit rule,
the letter to the Superintendent of Brokers, over which the Court
of Appeal had disagreed, was not mentioned. And most regrettably,
the policy split between Pull J.A. and Norris J.A., over the ap-
plication of Equity's old rules to modern corporate transactions
was avoided and the judicial leadership that one is entitled to
expect from the highest court was not forthcoming.
Cartwright J., quoted each of the judgments in Regal and
concluded that they all agreed, in varying terms, with the following
passages from the judgment of Lord Russell: .. .
. . . and having obtained these shares by reason and only by reason of
the fact that they were directors of Regal and in the course of exe-
cution of that office, are accountable for the profits which they have
made out of them.
As there was a finding of good faith rejection of the Dickson claims
by the Peso board, the subsequent purchase by Cropper was held
not to be in the course' of execution of his office of director and
the appeal was dismissed. All that has been said with respect to
the narrow view of the facts, and restrictive interpretation of the
law in the judgment of Bull J.A., applies equally to the judgment
of the Supreme Court and need not be repeated .
The decision in Peso, with its insistence that a director must
lao Ibid., at p. 139.
""Peso, supra, footnote 24, per Cartwright J., at p. 8, quoting Regal,
supra, footnote 27, per Lord Russell of Killowen, at p. 389 (emphasis added
by Cartwright J.) .
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be acting in the course of his office for liability to be imposed, is,
it is submitted, inadequate to deal with the corporate opportunity
problem. Moreover, to read Regal as requiring such a finding, at
least as so narrowly interpreted by Bull J.A . and Cartwright J.,
is not to appreciate the reach of the equitable principles reaffirmed
in that case . It is true that the two cases upon which the Supreme
Court relied, Regal and Zwicker v. Stanbury,"z both involved the
making of a profit by directors while in the course of carrying out
a corporate transaction. In Regal, the lessor required either that
Regal's directors guarantee the lease or that the lessee, a sub-
sidiary company, have a paid-up capital of Z5,000. The parent
company's finances would only allow a subscription for 2,500
shares, and the directors did not want to give personal guarantees .
As a result the directors (and two others) personally subscribed
for 3,000 shares, the parent company for 2,000 shares, and the
lease was granted to the subsidiary . The purchase of the 3,000
shares for which the directors were held accountable was clearly
part of the lease venture and in that sense was in the course of the
execution of the directors' office . In Zwicker, the directors, while
carrying out a financial reorganization of the company, purchased
some of the company's securities, including a second mortgage,
held by its principal creditor. Again, the directors were in the
course of carrying out corporate business when they entered into
the conflicting transaction . Does the test of "by reason of the fact
that they were directors, and in the course of the execution of
that office" require a showing, as the Supreme Court seemed to
think in Peso, that the director was actually engaged in carrying
out a transaction on behalf of the company?
The holding in Regal does not allow for such a narrow inter-
pretation . The passage from Lord Russell's judgment cited by
Cartwright J.,133 was the conclusion of an analysis of the facts to de
termine if the shares were acquired "by reason and in course of
their office of directors of Regal" ."' The facts revealed that the
profit was made out of the corporate venture and thus the con-
clusion that the directors were acting in the course of their office .
Lord Russell's judgment cannot be read to require participation
in company business as essential for a finding that the director
profited by reason of his fiduciary position. Nothing in Lord
Russell's judgment, taken as a whole, nor in the judgments of the
other Law Lords in Regal, nor in the judicial history of the im-
position of fiduciary standards on directors, justifies such a con-
clusion.
Each of the Law Lords in Regal referred to the old leading
132 Supra, footnote 26 . The Supreme Court first adopted the Regal
principle in Zwicker.
133 Supra, footnote 131 .
134 Regal, supra, footnote 26, per Lord Russell of Killowen, at p . 386 .
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cases on fiduciary duties and each gave approval to the broad
general rule that a director cannot use his office to appropriate
for himself an advantage that ought, in fairness, to belong to the
corporation. Thus Viscount Sankey referred to : . . .
. . . the general rule that a director . . . is liable to account for profits
made by him from knowledge acquired when so acting [in a fiduciary
capacity] .
Lord ..Macmillan asked the question whether ;,. ..
. . . what the directors did so related to the affairs of the company that it
can be properly said to have been done in the course of their manage-
ment and in utilization of their opportunities and special knowledge as
directors .
It is this concept of use of the position of director, or use of
knowledge that comes to a director by reason of his position to
gain advantage for himself when the interests of the company call
for protection, that underlies the holding in Regal. If the facts
of Regal were that one of the directors heard of an available
theatre and personally took a lease of it when he knew the com-
pany was looking for another location, can it be seriously con-
tended that he would not be liable to account? It is submitted that
he should be liable even if the knowledge of the availability of
the theatre did not come to him in his capacity as a director,
although it is recognized that the cases do not go that far. He is
a fiduciary, and if the circumstances are such that the interests of
his principal call for protection, he should be required to look
first to those interests rather than to his own. Equity's negative
"do not" takes too narrow a view of the directors' function, and
is inadequate to meet the corporate opportunity problem. The
directors should be considered to have an affirmative obligation to
advance the interests of the corporation and, at all times, to put
the corporation's interests ahead of their own."' Such a standard
does not place any great hardship on a fiduciary who, presumably,
is well rewarded, monetarily or otherwise, for the office he has
" 35 Ibid ., per Viscount Sankey, at p. 386 .i.. Ibid ., per Lord Macmillan, at pp . 391-392 (emphasis added) .... Such American cases as Rosenblum v . Judson Engineering Corp.,
supra, footnote 63 ; Production Mach . Co, v. Howe (1951), 99 N.E . 2d 32 ;
and Durfee v . Durfee & Canning, Inc . (1948), 80 N.E . 2d 522, indicate a
move to such an affirmative obligation. See generally, Note, Corporate Op-
portunity (1960-61), 74 Harv . L . Rev . 765 ; Note, A Survey of Corporate
Opportunity (1956), 45 Georgetown L.J . 99 ; Fuller, Restrictions Imposed
by the Directorship Status on the Personal Business Activities of Directors
(1941), 26 Wash. U.L.Q . 189 ; Walker, Legal Handles Used to Open or
Close the Corporate Opportunity Door (1961), 56 N.W.U.L . Rev . 608 ;
Note, Corporate Opportunity in the Close Corporation-A Different Result
(1967), 56 Georgetown L.7 . 381 . An important case in which the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit declired, by a majority, to take a more
expansive view of corporate opportunity is Burg v. Horn, supra, footnote
27 . For an excellent comment on Burg see Note, Corporate Opportunity
(1968), 43 N.Y.U.L. Rev . 187 .
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voluntarily undertaken .
The decision of the House of Lords in Phipps v. Boardman. ..
provides an instructive contrast with that in Peso . The facts in
Boardman are lengthy and complex but may be briefly summarized
as follows. A large part of the holding of a testamentary trust
consisted of an unprofitable investment in a private company.
The solicitor to the trust, Boardman, and one of the beneficiaries,
Tom Phipps, commenced negotations with the company to place
a representative of the trust on its board of directors . When they
were spurned, they decided that the best way to protect the trust
investment was for them personally to make a take-over bid for
the company's outstanding shares . The two active trustees were
informed of this plan and agreed to it . The third trustee, the
testator's widow, was senile and was not consulted . Boardman
and Phipps then represented to the company that they were
negotiating on behalf of the trust and in that guise obtained in-
formation about the company that was essential to their eventually
successful personal take-over bid. In fact, the trustees had neither
the money nor the legal power to purchase the shares as they were
not an authorized trust investment . After complete control was
acquired, capital distributions were made which resulted in a
profit for the trust and a £75,000 profit for Boardman and
Phipps . One of the beneficiaries brought an action to compel
Boardman and Phipps to account for their profit.
The House of Lords, by a majority of three to two, affirmed
the holding of the Court of Appeal.. . and the trial judge... that the
actions of Boardman and Phipps brought them within the profit
principle of Regal. They had obtained essential information while
purporting to represent the trust and notwithstanding that the trust
could neither legally nor financially purchase the shares, and that
their actions were throughout in the best interests of the trust and
resulted in a large profit to it, they must account for their profit .
Lord Denning M.R ., in the Court of Appeal, and Lord Cohen and
Lord Hodson were of the opinion that the conflict rule also ap-
plied."' Boardman had "placed himself in a position where there
was a conflict between his duty to advise an application to the
court [for sanction to purchase the shares] and his interest to
acquire the shares himself . . ." .
" 's Supra, footnote 27 .
139 [19651 Ch . 992 (C.A .) .
140 [19641 2 All E.R . 187 (Ch. D.) .
341 Viscount Dilhorne and Lord Upjohn also both recognized the profit
and conflict rules but decided that neither applied to the case .
142 Supra, footnote 139, per Lord Denning M.R., at p. 1020 . While
agreeing that there was a conflict rule separate from a profit rule, Lord
Upjohn objected to Lord Denning raising it as the point was not made in
the pleadings and was not raised in argument by counsel for the respondent
in any of the three courts, supra, footnote 27, at p. 131 .
1971]
	
The Saga of Peso Silver Mines 109
Aside from indicating a more stringent approach to the en-
forcement of fiduciary duties than that taken in Peso, the judg-
ments in Phipps are interesting for the discussion of whether the
information that Boardman and Phipps received while negotiating
with the company was property that belonged to the trust. Wilber-
force J., at the trial noted that the directors of the private company
would initially have refused to deal with Boardman and Phipps
as prospective purchasers unless they had appeared as repre-
senting a threatening minority . ®f what they learned, he said :"
In the Court of Appeal, Lord
This knowledge was (so far as the expression can be used) essentially
the property of the trust.
enning M.R., said :"
Likewise with information or knowledge which he has been employed
by his principal to collect or discover, or which he has otherwise ac-
quired, for the use of his principal, then again if he turns it to his own
use, so as to make a profit by means of it for himself, he is accountable,
. . . for such information or knowledge is the property of his prin-
cipal, just as much as an invention is .
1n the House of Lords, Viscount Dilhorne," Lord Hodson" and
Lord Guest"' agreed that knowledge acquired while acting for the
principal could be regarded as the principal's property. Lord
Cohen also agreed, although he expressed the matter somewhat
differently : 146
Information is, of course not property in the strict sense of that word
and . . . it does not necessarily follow that because an agent acquired
information and opportunity while acting in a fiduciary capacity he is
accountable to his principals for any profit that comes his way as the
result of the use he makes of that information and opportunity . His
liability to account must depend on the facts of the case.
®n the facts in Phipps, Lord Cohen held that the agents must ac-
count as they had profited through their share purchases by using
information they had acquired while negotiating for the trust.
1n his dissent, Lord Upjohn agreed that information could be
property, but only in certain limited circumstances :
In general, information is not property at all. It is normally open to
all who have eyes to read and ears to hear. The true test is to determine
in what circumstances the information has been acquired. 149
The real rule, is in my view, that knowledge learnt by a trustee
in the course of his duties as such is not in the least property of the
143 Supra, footnote 140, at p. 204 .
144 Supra, footnote 139, at pp. 1018-1019 (emphasis added by Lord
Denning) .
141 Phipps, supra, footnote 27, at pp . 89-90 . Viscount Dilhorne, however,
did not agree that on the facts in Phipps the information acquired was the
property of the trust.146 Ibid., at p . 107.147 Ibid ., at p . 115.148 Ibid., per Lord Cohen, at pp . 102-103 .149 Ibid ., per Lord Upjohn, at p. 127 .
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trust and in general may be used by him for his own benefit or for the
benefit of other trusts unless it is confidential information which is
given to him (1) in circumstances which, regardless of his position as
a trustee, would make it a breach of confidence for him to communi-
cate to anyone for it has been given to him expressly or impliedly as
confidential, or (2) in a fiduciary capacity, and its use would place him
in a position where his duty and his interest might possibly conflict150
Lord Upjohn then went on to apparently qualify his second rule :
. . . you have to look and see whether the knowledge acquired was
capable of being used for his own benefit to injure the trust .
As there was no possibility of the information being used to in-
jure the trust, and as the trust was itself incapable of purchasing
the shares, the. agents were free to purchase themselves .
It is unfortunate that the idea of information as property was
introduced in Phipps to further tangle the problem of fiduciary
obligations . It is unfortunate because it was unnecessary . The
question is not whether the information acquired by the agent is
the property of the trust, but is whether the agent used his position
to make a profit without the informed consent of his principal .
In Phipps the agents represented themselves to be agents in dealing
with the company . As a result of what they learned in that capacity
they profited without the consent of their principal . It matters
not that the principal could not purchase, or was not interested
in purchasing . It is for the principal to say if that is the case when
his consent is sought . It is not for the agent to say it after the fact
of having made his profit to justify his actions, regardless of how
bona file they may appear to be. One way, among many, in
which the position of a fiduciary may be used to make a profit,
is to turn to account information which was acquired while acting
as such. The idea of the information being the property of the
principal only serves to obscure the essential point that it is the
use of the fiduciary position to make a profit that is forbidden .
The knowledge or opportunity that comes to the fiduciary while
so acting must, of course, have some connection with the agency
being fulfilled . That, it is submitted, is all Lord Cohen meant when
he said that it does not necessarily follow that because a fiduciary
acquired some information or an opportunity while acting as such,
he is liable for anv profit he makes by use of it. In Phipps, and,
it is submitted, in Peso, there was a very clear connection .
A finding that the information was acquired by the fiduciary
in his capacity as such has been essential to establish liability . It
has been suggested that the law should not focus solely upon the
capacity in which the information was acquired and that a broader
concept of the directors' function is required to deal with the cor-
porate opportunity problem . A director may acquire information
150 Ibid ., at pp. 128-129.
151 Ibid., at p . 129 (emphasis added by Lord Upjohn) .
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otherwise than as a director and use it in a situation in which he
commits abreach of duty. For example, a director of a mining com-
pany may have been given information in his capacity as a pro-
moter and speculator in the mining industry without any reference
to his membership on the board of any particular company. Yet
the information may be valuable to that company and capable of
exploitation by it, in which case the director's use of it may well
constitute a breach of duty . He could not be said to have acquired
the information in circumstances in which he had an obligation
to transfer it to the company, yet he has acquired and used in-
formation which could have been used by the company and he
ought to be held liable to account.
Lord Upjohn's contention that the use of the information must
put the fiduciary in a position where his interest and duty are in
conflict, and his further elaboration that the information must be
capable of being used to injure the trust, are both without founda-
tion . Lord Upjohn himself said that there were two separate rules
and that the profit rule is merely part of the wider conflict rule."'
A showing of profit made by reason of the fiduciary position is
enough to found liability without a showing of conflict of interest .
Such a conflict will almost invariably be present, particularly where
information has been turned to profit, but that will not necessarily
be the case (as it was not in Phipps) 153 and its absence does not
affect the agent's liability to account. The notion that the informa-
tion acquired must be capable of being used to injure that trust is
contrary to the holding in Regal and the two-hundred-year-old
line of cases on which it depends. Moreover, as a matter of prin-
ciple it would be an unwise rule as it would leave the fiduciary,
and ultimately the courts, as the judge of whether it was capable
of causing injury or not. The person best able to make that decision
is the principal to whom disclosure should have been made in
the first place.
The concept of information as property is further clouded by
the question of whether the information was confidential . Thus in
Peso, Cartwright J. noted that the offer of the claims to Peso was
not "accompanied by any confidential information unavailable to
any prospective purchaser"."' Moreover, Cropper "did not have
access to any such information by reason of his office"."' It is not
153 Supra, footnote 27, at p. 123 .
153 As noted in footnote 142, supra, the conflict point was first raised
in the Court of Appeal by Lord Denning M.R . ; although the point was not
pleaded, no evidence had been adduced, and counsel did not argue it .
After Lord Denning raised it, Lord Cohen and Lord Hodson made it an
additional ground of liability in the House of Lords . At the trial, however,
the judgment of Wilberforce J. depended solely -on the profit rule, which
was the only ground of liability argued .
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clear what relevance the question of confidentiality has . If the in-
formation relates, or may possibly relate, to the affairs of the
company and the director acquired it while in the course of acting
for the company, he is bouna to give the opportunity of making
use of it to the company. If he makes use of it personally he will
have made a profit out of his office and must account . If the in-
formation was given to him confidentially on behalf of the com-
pany the position is exactly the same . If, in either case, the com-
pany decides that it does not want to make use of the information,
and in the absence of other disabling circumstances, the director
should be able personally to use the information . It is the use
that is made of the information that comes to a director in his
capacity as such that matters, whether it is confidential or not .
One scholar, Gareth Jones, has contended that the essential
questions in Phipps were avoided by the House of Lords . These
were whether Boardman and Phipps were unjustly enriched, and,
if they were not, did policy demand that they be made to ac-
count?"' Leaving aside for the moment the policy question, to
ask whether the agents in Phipps were unjustly enriched is just
another way of asking whether they acted bona fide in the best
interests of the principal, or, as Lord Upjohn would have it,
whether they caused injury to the principal. As noted above, to
ask such a question is, in effect, to overrule Regal and the Equity
learning behind it . The essential reason for the refusal of the
judges to delve into bona fides is that the courts are incapable of
arriving at the truth of the matter . The point was put succinctly
by Lord Wright in Regal:"'
. . . the court will not inquire whether the other person [the principal]
is damnified or has lost a profit which otherwise he would have got .
. . . Nor can the court adequately investigate the matter in most cases.
The facts are generally difficult to ascertain or are solely in the knowl-
edge of the person who is being charged. They are matters of surmise;
they are hypothetical because the inquiry is as to what would have
been the position if that party had not acted as he did, or what he
might have done if there had not been the temptation to seek his own
advantage, if, in short interest had not conflicted with duty .
Does this reasoning still have validity? In a recent trust case,"'
Danckwerts L.J., seemed to think not and rejected the idea that
a rigid rule must be applied because it is impossible to ascertain
whether the trustee was acting honestly or not . Chancery judges
were daily engaged in "ascertaining the knowledge and intentions"
of parties to proceedings .'"' Whether a trustee should be allowed to
purchase trust property at an auction, which was the issue in
156 Jones, op. cit ., footnote 31 .ie' Regal, supra, footnote 27, per Lord Wright, at p . 392 .. .. Holder v . Holder, [1968] Ch . 353 .
"IIbid ., at p . 398 .
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Holder, should be "a matter for the discretion of the judge"."'
It may be that in the usually less complex trust situation it is
easier to sort out truth, motivations, and intentions from the evi-
dence and actions of the parties than it is in the company situation.
For that reason the courts may well be justified in confining the
conflict principle to those cases, to use Lord Upjohn's phrase, in
which "there was a real sensible possibility of conflict""' and
ought not to search for possible conflicts in events not contem-
plated by the parties at the time . Moreover, even if there is a pos-
sibility of conflict, why should the fiduciary not be able to justify
his conduct where he can show not only that the trust has not
been injured, as in Keech, but also that it has greatly profited as in
Phipps? It may be thought that such an argument could be equally
well applied to a company case like Regal. There is after all not
much good sense in arguing for the maintenance of a rule that
is seen on occasion to do injustice merely because it is of ancient
lineage.
The facts of modern business "with the complexities involved
by interlocking, subsidiary and associated corporations""' argue,
it is submitted, for the maintenance and application of the old
equitable rules to directors. What was said in the introduction to
this article about the ease with which directors exercise almost
unchallenged control; how questionable actions appear as business
judgment; and how difficult it is for shareholders to ascertain the
facts and then take effective action on them, all make it imperative
that the courts continue to take an uncompromising attitude in
those few cases of breach of fiduciary duty that do surface in the
courts . Moreover, it is not true, at least not in the corporate con-
text, that the courts are readily able to "ascertain the knowledge
and intentions""' of the parties. The facts and evidence in a case
like Peso make that abundantly clear. In a case in which the finan-
cial inability of the corporation to take up the opportunity ,is al-
leged, it will never be entirely clear whether the corporation could
have, or indeed should have secured the necessary financing. Now
can it ever be entirely clear whether disinterested directors are
acting in the best interests of the company or of their fellow direc-
tors in rejecting a corporate opportunity? Is it not safer for. the
courts to continue to make it clear to directors that if they are
going to act in a situation in which their interest may conflict with
their duty that they must seek the approval of fully informed
shareholders? It is suggested that it is, and that the maintenance
of Equity's stern attitude is more than ever required for the
reasons so cogently noted in the dissent of Norris J.A . in Peso : . ..
166 Ibid . 161 Phipps, supra, footnote 27, per Lord Upjohn, at p. 124.
'"Peso, supra, footnote 28, per Bull 7.A ., at pp. 154-155.
163 Holder, supra, footnote 158, at p. 398.
164 peso, supra, footnote 28, per Norris J.A., at p. 139.
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. . . it seems to me that the complexities of modern business are a very
good reason why the rule should be enforced strictly in order that
such complexities may not be used as a smoke screen or shield behind
which fraud might be perpetrated . . . . No great hardship is imposed
on directors by the enforcement of the rule, as a very simple course is
available to them which they may follow .
The decision of the House of Lords in Phipps does not neces-
sarily give a different answer to Lord Greene's hypothetical than
does the decision of the Supreme Court in Peso . The House of
Lords was not faced with the hypothetical as the decision at the
trial was based solely on the fact of use of information acquired
while acting for the trust without the consent of the beneficiaries .
This was also the basis of the judgments in the Court of Appeal
and in the House of Lords. The fact of the legal and financial
inability of the trust to purchase could not be transformed, with-
out full disclosure, into bona fide rejection by the trust . The
hypothetical is still to be answered by the House of Lords. It is
suggested, however, that if the House were faced with the facts
of Peso its decision would be different from that of the Supreme
Court. Whatever the requirements of bona fide rejection should
be, they should not be satisfied on facts where the controlling
directors, one of whom is responsible for financial policy, decide
that the company is financially unable to purchase, and then within
a few weeks purchase themselves to "protect the interests of the
company" .
IV. Ratification.
Could the problem in Peso have been avoided if Cropper had
sought and received the approval of the company's shareholders?
Mr. Justice Norris, in his dissent, expressed the opinion that such
approval would have protected Cropper and relied on Lord
Russell's statement in Regal : . ..
They could, had they wished, have protected themselves by a resolution
(either antecedent or subsequent) of the Regal shareholders in general
meeting. In default of such approval, the liability to account must re-
main.
The question of which breaches of fiduciary duty are ratifiable and
which are not, is one of the most difficult in company law."'
If the wrong is ratifiable, the minority is precluded from bringing
a derivative suit."' Moreover, the directors are entitled to vote as
shareholders on matters in which they are interested.. . and this,
along with the control that the proxy machinery gives to them, can
"I Regal, supra, footnote 27, per Lord Russell, at p. 389.
166 gee generally Gower, op. cit., footnote 83, p. 564 et. seq.
167 Foss v. Harbottle, supra, footnote 17.
" 68 North West Transportation Company v. Beatty, supra, footnote 61 .
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mean that the procedure that is designed to protect the share-
holders may be used to sanction corporate wrongdoing. Ratifica-
tion and its relationship to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle has been
discussed extensively elsewhere.. . and the ratification point will
only be dealt with briefly here .
It is said that no majority of shareholders can give away
company assets and that this rule lies behind such cases as Menier
v. Hopper's Telegraph Works,"' Cook v. Deeks,"" Canada Safe
way Ltd. v. Thompson," and Park v. Daily News."' In Menier,
the directors used their votes as shareholders to compromise
pending litigation and then put the company into liquidation . As
a result they obtained for themselves the benefit of a contract in
which the company had been interested. In Cook, two directors
negotiated for themselves a contract in which the company was
interested and which they were under a duty to obtain for it. They
then used their controlling votes at the shareholders' meeting to
pass a resolution stating the company had no interest in the con-
tract. In Canada Safeway, a director was instructed to investigate
the affairs of a major supplier with a view to acquisition. After
his investigation, he obtained a personal option to purchase the
supplier's shares and upon purchase and resale of the shares to his
company through nominees realized a large profit . In Parke, the
controlling shareholders sold the assets of a subsidiary and pro-
posed to distribute the proceeds among its employees. At the suit
of one shareholder they were restrained from, doing so .
In both Menier and Cook the court said, in erect, that although
the shareholders may vote as they please, the majority cannot
appropriate the company's assets to themselves at the expense of
the minority." In Canada Safe-way, the trial judge observed that
the director's breach of duty could only be sanctioned by a un-
animous vote of the shareholders. In Parke, the giving away of
corporate assets for a purpose not incidental to the business was
held to be an ultra vires act and therefore beyond the 'competency
... See, Beck, op. cit., footnote 17, p. 572 et seq. ; Wedderburn, Slhare-
holders' Rights and the Rule in Foss v . Harbottle, [1957] Camb L.J . 194,
[1958] Camb . L.J . 93 ."o Supra, footnote 75 .
"' Supra, footnote 26.
171 Ibid.
173 [19621 Ch . 927." A Canadian case similar to Menier and Cook is Elliott v . Orr Gold
Mines Ltd. (1920), 17 O.W.N . 447 where the sale of the company's mining
claims at an undervalue to another company which the majority controlled
was restrained . The sale was held to be a fraud on the minority as the
majority were disposing of company assets to their own advantage. See
also Brown v . Can-Erin Mines Ltd. (1961), 25 D.L.R. (2d) 250 ; Gray v.
Yellowknife Gold Mines Ltd. and Bear Exploration and Radium Ltd.,
(No. I), [1947] O.R. 928, [1948] 1 D.L.R . 473 (Ont. C.A .) ; Gray v. Yellow-
knife Gold Mines Ltd . and Bear Exploration and Radium Ltd., (No . 2),
[19481 1 D.L.R . 74 (Ont . C.A .) .
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of the shareholders to confirm.
In Regal the directors were required to account for the profit
they had made on the sale of the shares . If they had not sold the
shares, they would have been constructive trustees of them for the
company and would have been required to transfer them to it . In
Zwicker the Supreme Court ordered the shares delivered to the
company for cancellation . If the plaintiff company had succeeded
in Peso, Cropper would have been required to transfer his hold-
ings in Cross Bow and Mayo to it . Yet in the opinion of Lord
Russell in Regal," Kellock J., in Zwicker," and Norris J.A .,
dissenting, in Peso,"' a majority of the shareholders could have
sanctioned the breach and allowed the directors to retain the
property in each case . If the property ought to have been acquired
for the company it is said to belong in equity to the company.
Why then can the shareholders permit the directors to keep for
themselves assets that belong to the company? How, in short,
can one rationalize the Menier principle with Lord Russell's dicta
in Regal?
It is tempting to say that there is a distinction between giving
away property that is in the company's possession and allowing
directors to take up opportunities that have not been reduced to
possession. The difficulty is that the cases do not divide that way.
Cook, Canada Safeway, Regal, Zwiker and Peso are all opportunity
cases . It is possible that the cases can be divided on the bases of
good faith"' This would separate Menier, Cook and Canada Safe-
way from Regal and Peso but would not satisfy for Zwicker where
the matter of bona fides was far from clear.
Professor Gower suggests that there is a distinction between
"misappropriating the company's property and merely making an
incidental profit for which the directors are liable to account to
the company"'" Thus it is argued that in Cook "it was the duty
of the directors to acquire the contracts on behalf of the company"
and to allow ratification would be to allow the company to give
away part of its assets'e° In Regal, on the other hand, "the direc-
tors had not misappropriated any property of the company" and
therefore the company could ratify what they had done."' With
great respect, it is difficult to accept this distinction between Cook
and Regal. In Cook, the company was in the construction busi-
ness and would clearly have been interested in the new contract
which the two directors enteied into with its primary client . In
"s Regal, supra, footnote 27, per Lord Russell, at p. 389."s Zwicker, supra, footnote 26, per Kellock J ., at p. 269 (D.L.R.) .
"'Peso, supra, footnote 28, per Norris J.A ., at pp . 139-140 .
"See Beck, op . cit ., footnote 17, p . 572 .
1as Gower, op. cit., footnote 83, p. 565 .
Ibid.
" Ibid., p. 566 .
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Regal, the company owned theatres and the directors took up
shares in the subsidiary which was used to acquire the lease in a
new theatre. In both cases the directors, in the course of acting
as such, took for themselves opportunities with respect to which
they had a duty to use their best efforts to acquire for the com-
pany .
rôfessor Gower finds trouble with his own argument, how-
ever, because the directors in Regal had used information which
came to them as directors and, on the authority of Phipps, such
information may be regarded as the company's property . As such,
it belongs in equity to the company and the shareholders cannot
make gifts of company property through ratification ."' While not
resolving this difficulty, Professor Gower says that it might not
have been improper to allow the shareholders in Regal to ratify
as the directors had not profited at the company's expense as
they had in Cook.
As has been said above, Regal is not similar to Cook because
the information which came to the directors is company property.
It is similar because in both cases the directors in the course of
acting for the company personally acquired property which it was
their duty to acquire for it . An "information as property" analysis
of the corporate opportunity cases can only further confuse an
already troubled area of the law. If Regal and Cook, as has
been submitted, are not distinguishable in terms of a corporate
property analysis, then the bona fides of the directors in Regal
becomes the distinguishing factor. One can readily agree with
Gower that in a Regal type situation there may be no impropriety
in allowing the directors to keep their profits. It must be recognized,
however, that to do so would put the courts in the position of
judging directors bona fides at the ratification stage, a judgment
they have refused to make, and have protested they are incapable
of making at the initial stage of deciding if there has been a
breach of duty. If what Lord Wright said in Regal... with respect
to the difficulty and dangers of attempting to judge bona fides
is valid, and it has been submitted that with respect to complex
corporate transactions it unquestionably is, then ratification should
not be allowed on the basis of the directors' bona fides. This
would result in a rule that, in most cases, the directors may not
take up an opportunity in which the company was interested
but decided, for whatever reason, not to take up itself . This is a
minor restriction that would impose little hardship on a director
while at the same time preventing conflict of interest situations .
To argue that such a restriction places too high an obligation on
directors and puts them in a difficult position is to argue that
282 Ibid.
283 Supra, footnote 27, at p. 392.
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directors become such because of the opportunity to exploit cor-
porate advantages . Cases like Peso and Regal, where the directors
who were charged with the financial management of the company
personally took up corporate opportunities after deciding that the
company was financially unable to purchase itself, argue for the
safety of such a rule."'
In a recent case, Bamford v. Bamford,"' the English Court of
Appeal held that the exercise of directors' duties for a "collateral
purpose" was ratifiable by the shareholders . Prior to the decision
of Buckley J ., in Hogg v . Cramphorn186 it had been the law that
such an exercise, as for instance the issue of shares to prevent a
takeover bid, which was the case in both Hogg and Bamford, was
ultra vires the directors And incapable of ratification."' In the
course of his judgment in Bamford, Harman L.J., said, in effect,
that a rnala fide exercise of powers by the directors is ratifiable
by the shareholders"" and relied on Lord Russell's dicta in
Regal."' With respect there was nothing in Lord Russell's judg-
184 The American courts are divided on whether there may be share-
holder ratification of directors' frauds. A majority of the states do not
allow ratification. Two cases which contain an excellent discussion of the
problem are Claman v. Robertson (1955), 128 N. E. 2d 429 (S.C . Ohio),
and Mayer v. Adams (1958), 141 A. 2d 458 (S.C. Del.) . The matter is
complicated in the United States by federal and state rules of procedure
which require a demand upon the company, which may mean a demand
upon the shareholders, to bring suit in the company's name where breach
of fiduciary duty is alleged before a derivative suit may be brought. Does
refusal by the shareholders to bring suit amount to ratification of the
breach? If it does, is demand still necessary in those jurisdictions where
ratification is not allowed? If it does not, may a shareholder bring a
derivative suit after the demand has been rejected by the shareholders?
See generally, Note, Shareholder Ratification of Directors' Fraudulent Acts
(1939-40), 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1368 ; Leavell, The Shareholders as Judges
of Alleged Wrongs by Directors (1960-61), 35 Tulane L. Rev. 331 ; Com-
ment, Shareholder Validation of Directors' Frauds : The Non-Ratification
v. The Business Judgment Rule (1963-64), 58 N.W.U.L. Rev. 807; Note,
The Non-ratification Rule and the Demand Requirement : The Case for
Limited Judicial Review (1963), 63 Col. L. Rev. 1086 ; Note, Demand on
Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit (1959-
60), 73 Harv . L. Rev. 746. The courts are also not clear on what constitutes
a non-ratifiable act. The line is drawn, as usual, between void and voidable
acts, with the distinction being that the grosser cases of breach of duty
are classified as void and therefore incapable of ratification . Gifts of cor-
porate assets to the directors are invariably considered to be void acts .
Thus almost all corporate opportunity cases would not be capable of rati-
fication .
1!S [19691 1 All E.R. 969 (C.A .) affirming [19681 2 All E.R . 655 (Ch.) .
Bamford followed a similar ruling in Hogg v. Cramphorn, [19661 3 All
E.R . 420 (Ch.) . Bamford is noted in (1968), 31 Mod. L. Rev. 688 and
(1969), 32 Mod. L. Rev. 563 . Hogg is noted in (1967), 30 Mod. L.
Rev. 777.lee Ibid.
"'Punt v. Symons & Co., [19031 2 Ch. 506; Piercy v. Mills, [19201
1 Ch . 77 ; Bonisteel v. Collis Leather (1919), 45 O.L.R. 195 ; Legion Oils
Ltd. v. Barron et al. (1958), 2 D.L.R. (2d) 505... . Bamford, supra, footnote 185, at p. 972."s Supra, footnote 27, per Lord Russell, at p. 389.
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ment which sanctioned the ratification of directors' mala fides.
Moreover, mala fides in Bamford was used in the sense of "not
for a proper corporate purpose" not in the sense of "for the
directors personal interests at the expense of the company" . Rati-
fication of acts for a "collateral purpose" should be confined to an
improper exercise of directors' powers . There is no warrant, on
the facts of Bamford, for extending ratification to a breach of
fiduciary duty which involves the taking of a corporate opportunity.
Although it is suggested that the ratification rule of Hogg and
amford is not applicable to corporate opportunity cases, the
rulings in those cases as to the voting of the directors' shares are
particularly important if ratification is to be allowed (although it
is submitted it ought not to be) in situations like Regal and Peso
where the courts are satisfied as to the directors' bona fides. ln .
Hogg, the directors were ordered not to vote the shares they had
improperly issued to themselves, but were not restrained from
voting their original shares . In Bamford, the holders of the newly
issued shares voluntarily refrained from voting . The learning of
North West Transportation v. Beatty... is that a director may use
his votes qua shareholder to ratify a contract with the company in
which he is interested . Whatever the merits of this rule,"' there
is no reason why it should be applied to cases where the taking
of a corporate opportunity is being sanctioned. The courts should
insist that the directors' acts be approved by a majority of dis-
interested shareholders. Nor should the directors be allowed to
solicit proxies in support of the ratification . Any director who is
truly acting bona fide should not object to, and has nothing to
fear from, the votes of his fellow, disinterested shareholders. The
denial of his shareholder vote to a director would be no more than
the application to corporate affairs of the commandment that no
man should be seen to be a judge in his own cause.
"0 Supra, footnote 168." Supra, footnote 61 .
